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INFO MEMO

June 16, 2015

FOR: COMMANDER, US ARMY PACIFIC (USARPAC)

FROM: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL WARGAMING TEAM

SUBJECT: DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITY (CONPLAN 5001) WARGAME ANALYSIS

Purpose. This memorandum provides analysis findings and key takeaways from the Naval Postgraduate School wargame in support of US Army Pacific G5 planning effort for contingency plan (CONPLAN) 5001: Defense Support to Civil Authority.

Analysis background. This wargame was designed to determine whether or not Task Force Homeland should be stood up as a command & control (C2) entity in response to a complex disaster scenario in the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The game considered two scenarios: one with no TF-Homeland, and one with TF-Homeland.

Analysis purpose and objectives. The intent of the game is not to exercise the precise response capability of the Title 10 and Title 32 forces. Instead, while this is a cooperative game, the game setup and pieces are only meant to introduce friction and competition for limited assets. The overall purpose is to capture the discussion between players during gameplay and the insights gained from the players after each game in order to identify seam issues and possible solutions. The first objective of the game players was to successfully execute DSCA response in order to minimize human suffering on Guam and the Hawaiian Islands due to concurrent disaster events. The second objective was to manage strategic risk to avoid possible OPLAN escalation.

Analysis methods. The game boards for the tactical players were developed to depict both physical damage and Persons at Risk (PAR). They were depicted as different colored stacks of chips that would be “whittled” down over time. Additionally, Operational & COCOM “forces available” boards represent TACON and /or OPCON of certain units. Written RFF forms and in-game observations capture inter-player discussion and friction points. At the tactical level, player actions and damage removal in the game were deterministic. The only variability introduced was adjudicating OPLAN escalation level risk. This was done through a simple dice role.

In-game data collection was done through a white cell “shadow” of each player’s actions, results and forces available. From this data collection, Team Hawaii analyzed the rate of which the PAR went down, both within each AO (TF-West & JTF-50) and overall across the entire AOR. The team also looked at the overall OPLAN Escalation Risk across the two scenarios.

Findings and recommendations. Team Hawaii’s primary finding was that the proposed CONPLAN 5001 Task Force Homeland C2 construct is viable and provides a *strategic* benefit over a no-Homeland construct. While there was no real significant difference in the rate of

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reduction of PAR in either scenario, the TF-Homeland scenario reduced overall exposure to strategic OPLAN escalation risk.

Additionally, Team Hawaii found that the prepositioning of units prior to the occurrence of the disaster speeds up the recovery process; while seemingly obvious, this game further reinforces that fact. Prepositioning was found to be critical in the Guam recovery effort, but less so in the Hawaii effort. This observation was attributed to the fact that Hawaii already has a significant force presence in the island chain and did not need to rely upon strategically lifted DoD assets from the US mainland or Japan.

Finally, the deployment of Carrier/Expeditionary Strike Group(s) for DSCA may not be necessary. This was based on the “tyranny of distance” precluding the utility of their arrival. It was determined that if the CSG/ESG was not sortied from homeport prior to disaster, their arrival within the AOR would come too late to have an appreciable effect on the outcome. Essentially, the effect was an increase in OPLAN Escalation Risk without a coinciding impact to the reduction of PARs.

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